stand out as having been especially influential, as well as controversial.
1
Macpherson concludes, Locke "went out of his way to transform the natural right of every individual to such property as he needed for subsistence and to which he applied his labor into a natural right of unlimited appropriation."* Moreover, he claims that one of Locke's major achievements was to transform and undermine the traditional view of property, which was based on the assumption that the earth was originally given to mankind in common, in order to justify an individual right of appropriation devoid of all moral obligations to others in society.
Both
Strauss and Macpherson have argued that Locke's account of property .represents the ideology of the rising bourgeoisie and is an attempt to provide a moral basis for laissez-faire capitalism.
Furthermore, Macpherson has suggested that the present difficulties of modern liberal democratic theory lie in the contradictions inherent in the "possessive individualism" of the seventeenth century theorists, like Hobbes and Locke.
The major problem with these theories, says Macpherson, is that they presuppose a modern concept of individualism, i.e., a belief that individuals are essentially possessors of rights, freed from all social obligations, except for a negative duty of non-interference, a belief that he claims is ultimately detrimental to human and social development.
In contrast, James Tully* has recently argued that Locke's conception of property is not to be understood in terms of a right in private property, but only as a right to use God's property for God's purposes.
"The kind of exclusive right which Locke develops," says Tully, "is the uniquely English concept of the use which a trustee is said to have in another's proper-ty."' Accordingly, there is no natural right to the appropriation of land in itself, but only an exclusive right to use the products of one's labour.
Far from attempting to provide a moral basis for laissez-faire capitalism, Locke's main ideological aim was to demonstrate "that fixed property in land does not have a natural foundation. NT Rather, private property in land is a purely conventional right established by government and based on mutual agreement. The point of departure for Tully's interpretation is the claim that Locke was seeking to ground property rights in accordance with traditional natural law theory, which typically treated private property, not as natural, but as a rational addition to the law of nature and as such, a product of convention or positive law.
It is my contention that these interpretations are examples of what Monson' calls "nothing but"
interpretations, i.e., they make the mistake of reducing Locke's theory to one basic principle, instead of recognizing the complexity of his philosophical project. On the one hand, Locke did propound a social and political philosophy which remained firmly rooted in traditional natural law theory; on the other hand, I will argue that he modified this theory in order to defend a natural right in private property.
Consequently, if both aspects of Locke's thought are fully considered, it can be shown that although Locke does justify private appropriation and accumulation beyond what is necessary for individual use, this is done, not for its own sake, but in order to bring about the conditions of greater productivity and wealth required to satisfy the natural law duty to preserve all mankind. This duty is correlated with the inclusive right that each man has to use those things necessary for his own preservation, a right which is prior to any exclusive right in property, and is the basis of Locke's own conception of an "original community."
It is this assumption of an "original community" that establishes the natural law parameters for the distribution of property within a just society.
In particular, any individual'8 exclusive right in property is always conditioned by a concommitant obligation to others, as determined by the inclusive right each man has to the means of self-preservation. What distinguishes Locke from a traditional natural law theorist, however, is that he also claims that rights in private property are completely natural, not conventional.
For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that Locke was neither a disguised Hobbesian nor that he was simply hiding behind traditional terminology, but was, in fact, a natural law theorist. While most commentators are as anxious as Locke appears to be to provide an analysis and justification of private property, my immediate intention is not to critique the solution, but to examine the basic supposition that underlies the problem itself. How does Locke understand the proposition that the earth was given to mankind in common? Chapter five seems to furnish little insight into the content of this proposition. Most commentators are equally unenlightening.
11
Macpherson, for example, merely reminds his reader that the belief in an "original community" was the traditional view, found in both medieval and seventeenth century Puritan theory, and then adds that Locke accepted this position only to refute the conclusions usually drawn from it, which had made property "something less than a natural individual right."
Although Macpherson is correct in observing the traditional character of this view, such an observation adds very little to our understanding of it, since there was no common consensus amongst natural law theorists as to its precise meaning.
In this section of the paper, I will outline two possible interpretations of the proposition that originally the earth was given to mankind in common. The first interpretation is that provided by the late six-teenth century Spanish Jesuit, Francisco Suarez, who produced one of the best summaries of the political philosophy of Neo-Thomism.
Samuel Pufendorf, a German Protestant, who attempted a reconstruction of natural law theory in the latter portion of the seventeenth century, will furnish the material for the alternative interpretation.
This will be followed, in the second section, by an attempt to ascertain the interpretation which Locke himself must have assumed, and a consideration of how this position would condition his conception of the right in property. It should be noted throughout this discussion that, despite our differences in interpretation, I am greatly indebted to the excellent historical analyses of Locke and other seventeenth century natural law theorists recently provided by James Tully and Richard Tuck.
41
Both of these works have established new standards for the understanding and appreciation of Locke's philosophical enterprise.
The notion of an "original community" is defined by Suarez in terms of the conception of a subjective right (ius).
In his De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore (1612) Suarez presents a two-fold analysis of the concept of a subjective right:
.... this name is properly wont to be bestowed upon a certain moral power which every man has, either over his own property or with respect to that which is due to him. For it is thus that the owner of a thing is said to have a right (ius) in that thing, and a labourer is said to have that right to his wages by reason of which he is declared worthy of his hire.
Indeed, this acceptation of the term is frequent, not only in law, but also in Scripture;
for the law distinguishes in this wise between a right (ius) |already established] in a thing and a right to a thing . . .
According
to this analysis, a subjective right designates either that which is rightfully one's own or that which is rightfully due to a person.
In other words, within the conception of a subjective right two senses may be distinguished:
(1) a right already established in a thing (ius in re) and, (2) a right to a thing (ius ad rem).
The right to a thing may be conceived as a morally valid claim to that which is due to a person as a matter of justice, but which he does not yet possess. The right in a thing is a right in that which morally belongs to a person, and which he does, in fact, possess.
In either case, a person is related to some thing in a way that is morally justified, although the exact nature of the relationship varies in each case. This dual relationship is rooted in the particular sense of "justice" as that which renders unto each person that which is his due. Again, it would seem that iua is so understood in the Digest in the passage (I.i.10), where justice is said to be the virtue that renders to every man his own right (ius suum), that is to say, the virtue that renders that which belongs to him. Accordingly, this right to claim (actio), or moral power, which every man possesses with respect to his own property or with respect to a thing which in some way pertains to him, is called iua; and appears to be the true object of justice Suarez then applies this dual conception of a subjective right to the notion of an "original community n which he describes in the following way: "nature has conferred upon men in common dominion over all things, and consequently has given to every man a power to use these things; but nature has not so conferred private property rights in connexion with that dominion . . . Following Aquinas, he notes that the institution of private dominion (exclusive property rights) is not opposed to natural law, but is merely a rational addition to the law of nature, based on human agreement. Since he equates "dominium" with "proprietas," common property is than referred to as "indefinite dominion" or "negative community."
It is not that the earth originally belongs to everyone, each man having a right to use what he needs. Rather, the earth belongs to no one, with each man having the ability to acquire exclusive property rights.
81
The difference between these two conceptions of "original community" is subtle, but significant. A classic example borrowed from Cicero's On Ends may help to illustrate this point. 
21
In this text, Grotius asks whether men in general possess any right over things which have already become the exclusive property of another. He comments that this appears to be a strange question, since it would seem that the right of private ownership has completely absorbed the right which had its origin in the state of community.
Responding to this question, however, Grotius argues that such is not the case, for one must consider that the intention of those who introduced private ownership was to deviate as little as possible from natural equity. Hence it follows, "That in direst need the primitive right of users revives, as if community of ownership had remained." 2 * The reason for this is not based on charity, but justice; it rests on the demands of a prior right to one's due, for "all things seem to have been distributed to individual owners with a benign reservation in favour of the primitive right." 2 ' The above illustration is based on the assumption that Grotius accepted some conception of a "positive community."
It should be noted, however, that this as- For instance, this God given common dominion is described in terms of a right to use the products of the earth as a means of self-preservation. "God gave his sons a Right to make use of the Earth for the support of themselves and Families." (1.37) Again, "God . . . himself gave them all a Right, to make use of the Food and Rayment, and other conveniences of Life, the Materials whereof he had so plentifully provided them." (1.41) By admitting a right to use the earth, prior to the establishment of exclusive property rights, Locke's Scriptural remarks seem, at least, to favour the notion of a "positive community."
Once Locke has shown that common dominion is in agreement with Scripture, he must also demonstrate that the notion of an original "positive community" is in accordance with natural law. Consistent with the tradition of natural law theory, Locke states, in various ways throughout the Two Treatises, that the fundamental law of nature is that mankind ought to be preserved." The validity of this appeal to natural law is not justified by Locke, he merely notes that "it is certain there is such a Law" and that it is "as intelligible and plain to a rational Creature, and a Studier of the Law, as the positive Laws of Common-wealths, nay possibly plainer." (2.12) Such a reluctance on the part of Locke to undertake a formal defense of natural law theory has led some commentators to deny that Locke really was a proponent of natural law. The task of presenting Locke's credentials as a natural law theorist is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper.
In lieu of such a defense, I will continue to take Locke at hi8 word, considering what he actually says, not what he may have wanted to conceal by such words. According to Locke, "the fundamental law of Nature (is) the preservation of Mankind." (2.135) Although stated in general terms, such a law or principle is meant to serve as a rational rule or guideline which directs human activity toward its proper end, and as a "law," one is said to be obliged or bound to act accordingly." At this level, the end or purpose under consideration is the preservation of mankind. By reformulating this principle as "all the Members of the Society are to be preserved" (2.159) Locke indicates that the "end" is to be understood in both its collective and distributive senses; not only is the human species to be preserved, but each member of that class is to be preserved as well. Given the general character of this principle of action, it is not immediately evident what particular activities are morally obligatory in order to guarantee that the "end" be achieved.
To satisfy this need, Locke manages to generate a complex web of interrelated rights and duties, thus defining in more detail certain types of normative behaviour.
11
To begin with, eaqh individual is said to have "the right to self-preservation." (2.11) And as one might expect, this right is correlated with the negative duty on the part of others not to interfere with the exercise of that right by the right holder.
In general, "no one ought to harm another in his life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions." (2.6) Thus far, Locke has said nothing that a typically "modern" natural rights theorist would find objectionable. Locke, however, restates this right of self-preservation in terms of a duty, i.e. "every one . . . is bound to preserve himself." (2.6) Hence, the right of self-preservation is also a duty which obliges the individual to preserve himself in existence.
It is not a right which one is free to exercise or not, for no man is at liberty to terminate his own life.
Locke's translation of the right of self-preservation into a corresponding duty is justified by the following argument:
(1) each man's life is the product of God's creative labour. Assuming the labour theory of ownership, (2) each man's life is not properly his own, but the property of God, its maker. And since (3) no man has a right to destroy that which does not belong to him, (4) no man has a right to destroy his own life. Furthermore, the right not to destroy one's life is equivalent to the negative duty that one must not interfere with one's life by destroying it. When viewed from the perspective of natural law, this negative duty can be transformed into a positive duty: for if the law of nature commands that each man be preserved in existence and it is morally wrong to act contrary to that command, and moreover one is obliged to act accordingly, then it is also one's positive duty to actively pursue that end. Consequently, each man has the positive duty to preserve his own life.
In addition to the duty to preserve oneself in being, every one has a similar duty "to preserve the rest of Mankind." (2.6) Locke also refers to this as "the Right (each man) has of Preserving all Mankind." (2.11) Although Locke does not explicitly explain how this duty is derived, it appears to follow from the original dictate of natural law, this time from its collective aspect.
If the end designated by natural law is the preservation of all mankind, then one's behaviour must be normatively directed toward the realization of that end, both positively and negatively.
Hence, each man has a negative duty not to interfere with the preserva-tion of his fellow man, as well as a positive duty to promote that preservation, in so far as he is able; both duties being designed as a means of preserving mankind as a whole. This returns us to Locke's original problem; to show "how Men might come to have a property in the several parts of that which God gave to Mankind in common." (2.5) Our previous analysis, however, places this problem in a clearer light. More specifically, since the earth originally belonged in common to all mankind, the problem is to show how an individual might justly acquire something as his own, without violating the common right of other men. Locke's solution to this problem seems to be something like the following: although the earth and all it contains was given to mankind for its use, "yet being given for the use of Men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular Man. In this case, he is directly responding to Filmer's criticism of those natural law theorists who grounded private property in the common consent of mankind.*" While the right in property is usually derived from the right to self-preservation, it must also be viewed in its relationship to the positive duty, not only to preserve oneself, but to preserve all of mankind as well.
Although each man is entitled to that which he has justly acquired through his labour, such a right iB not absolute.
Everyone In these passages Locke compares the exclusive right that each man has to the products of his labour (justice), with the inclusive right that each man has to use those things necessary for his own preservation (charity). Both claims are grounded in the natural law dictate that commands the preservation of all mankind. Justice requires that property justly acquired is to be respected, while charity refers to the "title" each man has to the means of subsistence, as well as the correlated duty on the part of others to see that this is provided, even if it would require some access to what one has justly acquired. This is in direct opposition to Strauss' assertion that "... need as such is not a title to property."" For Locke, such a title is based on the right to use those things necessary to preserve one's life (jus ad rem), a right which" is prior to the title derived from one's labour (ius in re).
To argue that Locke sanctions unlimited accumulation without concern for the needs of others is to deny what Locke explicitly says. Moreover, it fails to consider the general theoretical framework within which Locke is working.
The reason why Strauss and Macpherson see Locke as justifying unlimited accumulation without concern
for the needs of others, is that they fail to understand Locke'8 theory of property from within the perspective of natural law and an original "positive community." Since they do not recognize the existence of a positive right to property prior to the establishment of individual (exclusive) property rights, they cannot see how the former has priority over the latter. Consequently, they misinterpret the complete significance of Locke's initial limitations on private property:
(1) use, nonspoilage (2.31), and (2) leaving as much and as good in common for others. (2.27) For while it is correct to observe that these initial limits are "transcended" by the tacit consent to money, this is not to say that they are removed.'' Since money does not spoil, the consent to its use does allow the first limitation to be transcended.
A man is able to accumulate more land than he is able to use the products of, since it is now possible to exchange the surplus for money which does not spoil. This, however, creates the potential for the extension of land-holdings to the point where there is no longer any land left to be appropriated-an apparent violation of the second limit. This limit is also transcended in that it is replaced by a new standard of justice which maintains that since the private appropriation of land has led to an increase in productivity and therefore a greater standard of living for all, it is a more just arrangement than that which existed in the "state of nature," wherein land was unappropriated.
Macpherson warns that "this assumes . . . that the increase in the whole product will be distributed to the benefit, or at least not to the loss, of those left without enough land.
Locke makes this assumption."" But for Locke, this is not merely an assumption; it is a moral duty imposed by the law of nature.
Both of the initial limitations on property acquisition were intended to guarantee that the common right of all men to the means of subsistence was not violated. With the introduction of money, this right is not simply denied; it is re-established on a higher level. So while it is true that Locke does justify individual appropriation and accumulation beyond what is necessary for individual use, this is done in order to promote the conditions of greater productivity and wealth required to satisfy the duty to preserve mankind.
This process of accumulation is grounded in the prior supposition that private appropriation is always conditioned by the inclusive right of each man to use what is necessary for self-preservation, as well as the correlated duty on the part of others to assist those in need.
Locke, therefore, has not gone out of his way to justify an unlimited exclusive right in property for its own sake. Rather, his justification is based on the assumption that the right of appropriation, although greatly extended, is always conditioned by the prior inclusive right to one's due. In this way, the assumption of an original "positive community" establishes the parameters for his understanding of private property, in accordance with the law of nature.
Before continuing this discussion, however, an examination of Tully's conclusions are in order.
Contrary to the above interpretation, Tully has suggested that Locke's "property in" is not equivalent to "private property," but refers to a conditional right to use what has been given by God for man's support. Rather, it merely adds to the list of "rights" a duty of productive use, and there seems to be nothing incompatible in holding that owners of private property incur a duty to use that property for the benefit of society. "For where there is no commonwealth, there is ... a perpetual war of every man against his neighbor; and therefore every thing is his that getteth it,and keepeth it by force; which is neither propriety, nor community; but uncertainty." Leviathan, chapter 24.
